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UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT-SAY GOODBYE TO DONNA 
REED: RECOGNIZING STEPMOTHERS' RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Donna Reed has been described as the "quintessential Ameri­
can housewife."! Similarly, her family could be described as the 
quintessential American family-"a husband who was employed, a 
wife who was a homemaker, and two or three children."2 However, 
the definition of the "American family" is constantly in transition.3 
For example, consider the evolution of American families in popu­
lar television since the "Donna Reed era,"4 such as the blended 
family in The Brady Bunch,5 and the same-sex couple who adopted 
and raised a son in Will & Grace.6 Statistics also prove that the 
composition of the American family is ever changing. In 1970, forty 
1. Gilmore Girls: That Damn Donna Reed (WB television broadcast Feb. 22, 
2001); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women: 
"No Empirical Evidence?," 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 n.27 (1992) (stating that "televi­
sion presented images of the idyllic housewife in The Donna Reed Show" (citing The 
Donna Reed Show (ABC television broadcast 1958-1966»). 
2. Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same·Sex Marriage 
from the Perspective ofa Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 417 n.44 (1999). 
Furthermore, "[t]he 1950s saw the advent of such television staples as The Ozzie and 
Harriet Show, Leave it to Beaver, and The Donna Reed Show, all of which featured 
suburban mothers who cared for their homes and imparted meaningful moral instruc­
tion to their children." Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizen­
ship, Gender, and Social Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 123 
(2002). 
3. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) ("The demographic changes of 
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family."). 
4. Amy D. Ronner, Women Who Dance on the Professional Track: Custody and 
the Red Shoes, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 173, 184 (2000) ("[O]ne scholar has coined the 
'so-called "Donna Reed" era,' with a 'working father and a mother who remained at 
home with the children' ...." (quoting Debra L. Swank, Day Care and Parental Em­
ployment: What Weight Should They Be Given in Child Custody Disputes?, 41 VILL. L. 
REV. 909, 919·20 (1996»). 
5. The Brady Bunch (ABC television broadcast 1969-1974). This series focused 
on a blended family in which Mike Brady, who had his three sons from a previous 
marriage, married Carol, who had three daughters from her previous marriage. ld. 
6. Will & Grace: The Finale (NBC television broadcast May 18, 2006). 
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percent of American households consisted of a heterosexual mar­
ried couple with minor children.? By 2003, that percentage had 
dropped to twenty-three.8 In order to reflect the continuous change 
in the definition of family, legislatures and courts must say goodbye 
to the Donna Reed mold and legalize relationships that society al­
ready views as part of the family unit.9 
While many states have taken a liberal approach to recognizing 
new familial relationships, some courts and legislatures have been 
unwilling to expand their definition of family beyond the traditional 
nuclear family.lO In Amy G. v. M. W., the California Court of Ap­
peal held that a stepmother, who had raised her stepson since in­
fancy, could not be joined as a necessary party in a maternity suit 
because she lacked standing as an interested person. l1 The court 
reasoned that because Amy G. had no biological connection to the 
child, and the biological mother had also petitioned for maternity, 
Amy G. did not have standing because she could not be the child's 
mother.12 In so deciding, the court applied California's enactment 
of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).13 This Note examines that 
7. JASON FIELDS, V.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING AR­
RANGEMENTS: 2003, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20­
553.pdf. 
8. Id. 
9. See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that granting marriage licenses to only heterosexual couples violated the Mas­
sachusetts constitution). 
10. Various courts have enacted legislation that limits the definition of marriage 
as between one man and one woman, and considers marriages entered into by same-sex 
couples in other jurisdictions to be void. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis 
2006); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (Lexis­
Nexis 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2005); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1704 (West 2001). Some states directly or indirectly preclude same-sex couples from 
adopting children. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, V.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., WHO MAY ADOPT, BE ADOPTED, OR PLACE A CHILD FOR ADOPTION? 
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 3 (2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/system 
widellaws_policies/statutes/partiesall.pdf (Florida and Mississippi have enacted specific 
legislation that disallows same-sex couples to adopt; V tah has enacted legislation that 
only allows married couples to adopt children and does not allow same-sex couples to 
marry); see also B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a woman whose 
partner had adopted a child during their eight-year relationship did not have standing 
to allege status as a de fasto custodian despite her financial and emotional care for the 
child). 
11. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review de­
nied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
2252 (2007). 
12. Id. 
13. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B V.L.A. 377 (2001); see CAL. FAM. CODE 
§§ 7600-7730 (West 2004). 
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law and proposes that the UPA be read in a gender-neutral fashion 
to allow a stepmother to have standing as an interested party in an 
action to establish maternity. 
Part I of this Note details the history of the UPA, the guiding 
principles used by courts in deciding paternity issues, and how 
courts have interpreted the UPA to find legal parentage in persons 
who are not the child's genetic parents. Part II examines the factual 
and legal background of Amy G. and discusses the various argu­
ments as to whether Amy G. should have had standing to assert her 
claim. Part III concludes that a gender-neutral application of the 
UPA, which would give stepmothers standing in maternity suits, is 
the correct interpretation for several reasons: First, a child can 
have three potential parents for the purpose of standing, and the 
court can thereafter determine who the child's two legal parents are 
at a trial on the merits.14 Second, since biology is not the deciding 
factor in all parentage determinations, genetics should not trump all 
other factors in maternity suits. IS Third, a stepmother should have 
standing in a maternity suit because a child can have two mothers.16 
Fourth, a stepmother, like a stepfather, should benefit from the pre­
sumption of legitimacy, which is also known as the marital pre­
sumption.17 Finally, upon granting a stepmother standing to assert 
maternity, her claim to maternity can be weighed against the bio­
logical mother's claim through a gender-neutral reading of the 
UPA.18 
14. See infra Part III.A; see also L.A. County Dep't or Children & Family Servs. 
v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) (granting two men standing in a 
paternity action and determining who the child's legal father was at trial); L.A County 
Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Mario A. (In re Kiana A), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 
675-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) 
(same). 
15. See infra Part III.B; see also Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly 
H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002) (granting a nonbiological parent stand­
ing in a parentage suit); Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salva­
dor M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (same); L.A County Dep't of 
Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (same). 
16. See infra Part IILC; see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 
117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a child can have two legal mothers). 
17. See infra Part IILD; see also Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I. 
1990) (discussing the presumption of legitimacy). 
18. See infra Part 1I1.E. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 
1993) (applying the UPA, in a gender-neutral fashion, to a situation that was not con­
templated when the UPA was drafted). 
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I. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
Over time, courts and legislatures have shifted their standing 
analysis in parentage suits from the principle that biology or mar­
riage trumps all other factors, toward recognition of the rights of 
persons not traditionally seen as parents.19 This Part discusses the 
process that some courts have used in recognizing different familial 
relationships. Subpart A addresses the drafting of the UPA, from 
its original purpose of protecting nonmarital children to recent revi­
sions made necessary by advances in science.2o Subpart B discusses 
some principles that courts consistently use in determining parent­
age such as the marital presumption, the importance of a biological 
relationship with the child, the two-legal-parents paradigm, and the 
"best interests of the child" standard.21 Finally, subpart C details 
the way in which the UPA has been interpreted to allow persons 
other than biological mothers and fathers to have standing and, in 
some cases, to be declared legal parents.22 
A. Enactment and Pertinent Provisions 
1. Introduction 
In 1972, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni­
form State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted the UPA with the purpose of 
"eliminat[ing] the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
19. See generally Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A2d 726, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) 
(stating that the purpose of the marital presumption was to prevent the stigma of illegit­
imacy); Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161, 167 (Wash. 2005), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) ("Washington courts have long recognized that individu­
als not biologically nor legally related to the children whom they 'parent' may neverthe­
less be considered a child's 'psychological parent.' "). 
20. See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between 
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPo L. 125, 129 
(2006); Jenny Wald, Legitimate Parents: Construing California's Uniform Parentage Act 
to Protect Children Born into Nontraditional Families, 6 J. CTR. FOR FAM. CHILD. & 
CTS. 139, 140 (2005). 
21. See generally Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669 (two-parent paradigm); N.AH. V. 
S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (best interests of the child standard); John M. V. Paula T., 
571 A2d 1380 (Pa. 1990) (marital presumption); John Lawrence Hill, What Does It 
Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991) (importance of biology). 
22. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660; L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family 
Servs. V. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Johnson, 851 P.2d 776; 
Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. V. Leticia C. 
(In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); N.AH. V. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 
(Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
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children."23 At early common law, a nonmarital child "was filius 
nullius, a child without rights. "24 The phrase "filius nullius" sum­
marizes the English and American rule that a nonmarital child had 
no specific right to support from either biological parent.25 In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down 
several decisions declaring that the legislatively mandated unequal 
treatment of children based upon the marital status of their biologi­
cal parents was unconstitutional.26 As a result, the UPA was 
drafted to provide a solution for legislatures in states whose previ­
ous laws had discriminated between marital and nonmarital 
children.27 
Changes in technology, primarily those advances in the area of 
genetic testing, necessitated that a new version of the UPA be 
drafted in 2000.28 The UPA was further modified in 2002 to include 
provisions that grappled with new scientific advances and defined 
parties to paternity and maternity suits.29 Currently, some version 
23. Wald, supra note 20, at 140; see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 
378-80 (2001) (prefatory note). "The parent and child relationship extends equally to 
every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id. § 2. 
24. R.H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nul­
lius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 432 (1977). 
25. Id. at 431. In 1576, the English Parliament passed the Poor Law due to the 
financial burden on the English Church and State, which was created by the complete 
lack of support from nonmarital parents. It provided that the government would im­
pose a criminal penalty on biological parents who failed to provide sustenance for their 
nonmarital children. H. Paul Breslin, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy 
for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L. REV. 859, 859 n.5 (1966) (citing Poor Law Act of 
1956, 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (Eng.». The vast majority of American states have followed suit 
and enacted similar laws. Id. at 860. 
26. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that 
a Texas court's denial of child support for nonmarital minor children was unconstitu­
tional because a state could not "invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children"); 
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165-67 (1972) (determining that the 
denial of the rights of dependent nonmarital children to recover under Louisiana's 
workmen's compensation laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, considering that their siblings who were marital children were able to 
recover); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69-72 (1968) (holding that the Louisiana Court 
of Appeal's interpretation of a "child" who has standing to bring a wrongful death 
action to mean only a "legitimate" child violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminated against a class of persons whose legiti­
macy had no relation to the tort that was the subject of the action); John G. New, Note, 
"Aren't You Lucky You Have Two Mamas?": Redefining Parenthood in Light of Evolv­
ing Reproductive Technologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 777 
(2006). 
27. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378 (prefatory note). 
28. Meyer, supra note 20, at 129. 
29. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: 
Children's Issues Remain the Focus, 37 FAM. L.Q. 527, 532 (2004). 
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of the UPA has been adopted in twenty-one states.3D In these 
states, the UPA plays an integral part in assisting legislators in up­
dating and interpreting their parentage statutes in accordance with 
the evolving definition of family. Its continuing role is marked by a 
purpose of preventing discrimination based on legitimacy and revi­
sions addressing scientific advances. 
2. Relevant Paternity Provisions of the UPA 
In conjunction with its broad purpose to ensure equal treat­
ment of marital and nonmarital children, the UPA includes provi­
sions to determine paternity that encompass the broadest number 
of potential fathers. 31 These provisions reflect a general concern 
for the "financial and emotional consequences of a child having 
only one legally recognized parent."32 Specifically, there are three 
dominant reasons why an increase in the number of potential fa­
thers furthers the UPA's general goals: First, it prevents the socie­
tal problem of having children who have only one legal parent, are 
financially dependent on the state, and lack the emotional and fi­
nancial security of the historically recognized two-parent support 
system.33 Second, it preserves a child's relationship with the person 
that the child recognizes as a parent.34 Third, it protects the rights 
that a child acquires through parents, including the rights to receive 
30. The 1973 UPA was adopted in whole or in part by Alabama, California, Colo­
rado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Ohio, and Rhode Island. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 65 
(Supp. 2007). Delaware, North Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming also adopted the 
1973 UPA and later repealed the Act in order to adopt the 2000 version. Id. Further­
more, the 2000 version (including the 2002 amendment) has been amended or adopted 
by Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2007). 
31. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16­
17. 
32. Maggie Manternach, Note, Where Is My Other Mommy?: Applying the Pre­
sumed Father Provision of the Uniform Parentage Act to Recognize the Rights ofLesbian 
Mothers and Their Children, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 385, 388 (2005). 
33. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(a) (West 2004). When the California legislature 
adopted the UPA, it added a provision regarding the purpose of establishing paternity: 
There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all chil­
dren. Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support award, 
which, in turn, provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, in­
cluding, but not limited to, social security, health insurance, survivors' bene­
fits, military benefits, and inheritance rights. Knowledge of family medical 
history is often necessary for correct medical diagnosis and treatment. Addi­
tionally, knowing one's father is important to a child's development. 
[d. 
34. See Wald, supra note 20, at 145. 
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child support and health insurance benefits while the parent is 
alive,35 and to inherit by intestacy, receive life insurance benefits, 
social security benefits, and standing in a wrongful-death suit in the 
event of a parent's death.36 In light of these reasons, the UPA's 
presumed-father provision includes the broadest possible number 
of potential fathers to protect a child's two-parent support system 
and the rights acquired with that system.37 
The UPA provides a number of specific ways that a parent and 
child relationship can be established.38 However, only interested 
parties can bring an action to establish a parent-child relationship.39 
In such an action, the child, the natural mother, and any men al­
leged to be the natural or presumed father, have standing and may 
be joined as necessary parties.40 
The UPA specifies a procedure for determining paternity when 
there are several alleged fathers.41 It states that a man may be pre­
sumed to be the father if he: (1) was married to the mother during 
the birth of the child, (2) attempted to marry the mother before the 
birth of the child, (3) married or attempted to marry the mother 
35. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1038 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2005). 
36. See generally Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that children's 
rights to sue for the wrongful death of their parents could not be denied because their 
mother was not married at the time of their births). 
37. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204 (amended 2002), 9B u.L.A. 16-17 
(Supp. 2007). 
38. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 3, 9B U.L.A. 391-92 (2001) ("(1) 
the natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or 
under this Act; (2) the natural father may be established under this Act; (3) an adoptive 
parent may be established by proof of adoption ...."), with UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr 
§ 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (stating that the mother and child relationship 
may be established by giving birth to the child, adjudication of a woman's maternity, 
adoption, or adjudication of maternity under a gestational agreement, and the father 
and child relationship may be established by an unrebutted presumption of paternity, 
acknowledgment of paternity, adjudication of paternity, adoption, consent to assisted 
reproduction, or adjudication of paternity under a gestational agreement.). 
39. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2004); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) 
§§ 6(b), 21, 9B U.L.A. 411, 494 ("Interested persons" are limited to those who have a 
particular interest in the action, which include mothers, fathers, and potential fathers.). 
In the new Uniform Act, "the child, the mother of the child, a man whose paternity is to 
be adjudicated, a support-enforcement agency, an authorized adoption agency or li­
censed child-placing agency, a representative of a deceased, incapacitated or minor per­
son, or an intended parent under a gestational contract have standing." Nat'l 
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Summary: Uniform Parentage Act (2002), 
http://www.nccusl.orglUpdate/uniformacCsummaries/uniformacts-s-upa.asp. 
40. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 9, 9B U.L.A. 435. 
41. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16-17; UNIF. 
PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 393-94. 
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after the birth of the child, (4) "receive[d] the child into his home 
and openly [held] out the child as his natural child," or (5) acknowl­
edged paternity in writing.42 If conflicting presumptions arise, each 
man will have standing43 and, at trial, the court will weigh the com­
peting claims according to "policy and logic."44 Based on these pro­
visions, determinations of paternity follow a three-step procedure: 
First, a presumed father receives standing in a paternity action.45 
Second, the court determines if it is an "appropriate action" for the 
presumption to be rebutted. If this is the case, the court will move 
to the third and final step of weighing the evidence according to 
"policy and logic" to determine which presumed father should be 
the child's legal father. 46 
Interestingly, the UPA specifies that those provisions relating 
to paternity also relate to maternity, "[i]nsofar as practicable."47 
However, the UPA provides separately for the establishment of a 
mother and child relationship.48 Under UPA section 201, a mother 
and child relationship can be established in only four ways: (1) 
proof of giving birth to the child; (2) adjudication of maternity; (3) 
adoption; and (4) adjudication to confirm a surrogacy agreement.49 
The narrow scope of section 201 stands in stark contrast to those 
provisions granting standing to the broadest number of potential 
fathers in a paternity action in order to avoid a determination of 
42. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 393-94. The 2002 version of 
the UPA does not include a presumption for men who have signed an acknowledgment 
of paternity, and it replaced "received the child into his home" with "for the first two 
years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the child." UNIF. PAR· 
ENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17. Other jurisdictions that have not 
adopted the UPA have adopted similar statutes. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, 
§ 6(a) (2007) (creating a presumption of paternity in a man if he was married to the 
mother, he and the mother "received the child into their home and openly held out the 
child as their child," or he signed an acknowledgment of paternity). 
43. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 602 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 338. 
44. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 394. 
45. See Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding 
that a man who was not married to the biological mother but who held the child out to 
be his own child had standing and remanding for a determination of whether it was an 
appropriate action to rebut the presumption). 
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 394. 
47. Id. § 21. Some jurisdictions where the UPA has not been adopted have en­
acted provisions declaring that paternity provisions also apply to actions to establish 
maternity. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 21 (discussing actions to establish a 
mother and child relationship and stating "[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions of this 
chapter applicable to establishing paternity shall apply"). 
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15. 
49. Id. 
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illegitimacy.5o However, the drafters' allusion to the application of 
the presumptions of paternity to maternity claims suggest that sec­
tion 201 is not the exclusive means of determining a mother and 
child relationship.51 
B. 	 Courts' Central Principles of Determining Parentage 
In light of the evolving definitions of parentage and family, 
courts are often forced to determine parentage among several per­
sons, each of whom has a parental role with the child.52 In so doing, 
courts adhere to several core principles that are fundamental to cur­
rent definitions of parentage and family; namely: (1) the impor­
tance of the marital relationship and the presumption of 
legitimacy;53 (2) the importance of the biological parent-child rei a­
tionship;54 (3) the importance of a child having two legal parents;55 
and (4) the necessity that the best interests of the child trump all 
other considerations.56 Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
1. 	 The Importance of Protecting the Marital Relationship 
and Presumption of Legitimacy 
At early common law, the presumption of legitimacy-that a 
child born into a marital family was a biological child of that 
union-was virtually unassailable.57 The purpose of this presump­
tion was to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy. 58 This 
50. 	 See id. § 204. 
51. 	 UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 21, 9B U.L.A 494. 
52. See, e.g., L.A County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In 
re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); N.AH. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
53. See generally N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 360 ("[T]he presumption of legitimacy is 'one 
of the strongest presumptions known to the law.'" (quoting AG. v. S.G., 609 P.2d 121, 
124 (Colo. 1980))). 
54. 	 Hill, supra note 21, at 370. 
55. Meyer, supra note 20, at 133 (quoting V.c. v. M.J.B., 748 A2d 539, 555 (N.J. 
2000)). 
56. Andrew S. Epstein, The Parent Trap: Should a Man Be Allowed to Recoup 
Child Support Payments If He Discovers He Is Not the Biological Father of the Child?, 
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 655, 663 (2004). Other principles have also been noted: "[T]he 
mother-child relationship is always seen as primary. The father-child relationships 
(whether based in biology or not) are always secondary .... [W]omen's biological ties 
to children are seen as largely inseparable from their social ties to children." Susan E. 
Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal 
Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 289 (2003) (citations 
omitted). 
57. John M. v. Paula T., 571 A2d 1380, 1383-84 (Pa. 1990) (stating that the mari­
tal presumption is "one of the strongest presumptions known to law"). 
58. '''[T]he status "illegitimate" historically subjected a child to significant legal 
and social discrimination.'" Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A2d 726, 728 (Pa. 1997) 
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presumption was only rebuttable under the four-seas doctrine.59 
This doctrine provided that a child is presumed to be born of the 
marriage unless a party submitted proof that the "man was beyond 
the reach of both England and the child's mother."60 Therefore, at 
English common law, the presumption that a child was conceived 
from the marital union was conclusive absent proof showing that 
the husband and wife did not cohabit ate at the time of conception. 
Currently, the presumption is not as definite as it was under 
the common law.61 However, it remains a foundational principle to 
which many courts adhere.62 American courts have expanded the 
available defenses to rebut the presumption of legitimacy beyond 
the four-seas doctrine.63 For example, the presumption may be re­
butted by proof that there was no marital cohabitation at the time 
of the child's conception,64 proof that the husband was sterile or 
impotent,65 or, occasionally, a blood test showing that the husband 
(quoting John M., 571 A.2d. at 1383 n.2). There are several reasons for the marital 
presumption, including the protection it affords to constitutional privacy and parenting 
rights. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of 
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 249 (2006); supra text 
accompanying notes 24-25. See generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 
(1925) (discussing how it is implicit in parents' Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights that they are to be in charge of parenting decisions); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390,402-03 (1923) (same). 
59. Meyer, supra note 20, at 127; Steven N. Peskind, Who's Your Daddy?: An 
Analysis of Illinois' Law of Parentage and the Meaning of Parenthood, 35 Loy. U. CHI. 
L.J. 811, 836 (2004). 
60. Meyer, supra note 20, at 127; Peskind, supra note 59 ("[T]he four-seas doc­
trine, thus provided that 'if a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas 
of England during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting 
doubt on his paternity.'" (quoting In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930))). 
61. c.c. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990). 
62. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(1) (West 2002) 
("A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if ... [h]e and the child's 
biological mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during 
the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, 
or divorce."); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) ("[T]he presumption 
of legitimacy is 'one of the strongest presumptions known to the law.''' (quoting A.G. v. 
S.G., 609 P.2d 121, 124 (Colo. 1980))). 
63. See generally c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 369; Meyer, supra note 20, at 127. 
64. Meyer, supra note 20, at 127. 
65. Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation 
of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 527 (2000). 
The [marital] presumption elided the biological facts in an era in which they 
were unknowable. The presumption did not apply to cases in which the 
mother's husband could not have been the father of his wife's child-cases in 
which a man was sterile, impotent, or, in Blackstone's words, "extra quatuor 
maria, [beyond the four seas] for above nine months." 
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could not be the biological father.66 Notwithstanding these excep­
tions, the burden on the party seeking to rebut the presumption of 
legitimacy is a heavy one.67 In addition to the expansion of availa­
ble defenses, another difference between the modern and common 
law applications of the presumption of legitimacy is that some juris­
dictions apply the presumption to children born into same-sex 
relationships.68 
2. The Importance of Biology 
Biology is particularly important when it comes to parentage­
especially maternity.69 Under the UPA, there are many ways for an 
alleged father to have standing.7° However, the only ways to estab­
lish maternity are by giving birth to the child, legal adjudication, or 
adoption.71 These contrasting provisions illustrate the existence of 
a strong presumption in favor of using biology in establishing ma­
ternity.72 Consider the principle of mater est quam gestation 
demonstrate, which means "by gestation the mother is demon­
[d. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 457 
(1. Chitty ed. 1857». 
66. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 369. 
67. See id. (stating that presumption of legitimacy is only rebutted by evidence 
that proves "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the husband either did not have access to 
the wife during the child's conception, his impotency, or by a blood test that conclu­
sively excludes the husband (citing In re J.S.Y., 524 N.E.2d 826, 828-29 (Mass. 1988))). 
But see Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relation­
ship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 369 (1988) (arguing that if "the putative father ha[s] a 
developed relationship with his child ... he may be granted a right of action to rebut 
the marital presumption"). 
68. Appleton, supra note 58, at 228; Allison J. Stone, Comment, "Sisters Are 
Doin' It for Themselves!" Why the Parental Rights of Registered Domestic Partners Must 
Trump the Parental Rights of Their Known Sperm Donors in California, 41 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 505, 523-24 (2007) (explaining that California's Domestic Partnership Rights and 
Responsibilities Act of 2003 gives each partner in a same-sex domestic partnership pre­
sumed parent status). 
69. Hill, supra note 21, at 370. 
70. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. A man is a presumed father if he 
was married to the mother at the time of the child's conception, birth or shortly after 
the birth, or if he resided in the same household as the child and held the child out as 
his own. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a)(I)-(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16-17 
(Supp. 2007). A presumed father has standing to maintain a paternity proceeding if he 
is the "man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated." Id. § 602(3). 
71. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 201(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15. 
72. See generally Appleton, supra note 58, 230-31. However, some have argued 
that "while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not the sine qua non of 
motherhood." HilI, supra note 21, at 370. 
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strated."73 Gestation does not create a presumption of maternity, 
rather, it demonstrates maternity.74 
This is significant because, in determining paternity, a man's 
biological relationship with the child only creates a presumption of 
paternity, it does not demonstrate paternity.75 Moreover, a pre­
sumption of fatherhood is more often due to the presumption of 
legitimacy, rather than proof of an existence of a biological rela­
tionship.76 Accordingly, the importance of a biological relationship 
with the child, which is given heavy if not dispositive weight in de­
terminations of maternity, is significantly less important in paternity 
proceedings because paternity is more often linked to the status of 
marriage.77 
3. The Importance of Two Legal Parents 
Historically, society and the legal system have recognized the 
importance of a two-parent family.78 A two-parent family is legally 
important because both individuals provide the child with financial 
and emotional support, keeping the child from becoming a ward of 
the state.79 Studies have shown that children from two-parent farni­
73. Hill, supra note 21, at 370. In some circumstances gestation will not demon­
strate maternity. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding 
that the child's legal mother was the biological mother, not the gestational surrogate); 
L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a child's sister who raised the child was 
her legal mother when the child's biological mother was deceased). 
74. Hill, supra note 21, at 370. 
75. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004). 
76. Hill, supra note 21, at 372-73; see also Part l.B.1. 
77. See Appleton, supra note 58, at 230-31; Dalton, supra note 56, at 289. 
78. Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Pater­
nity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 834 (2006) (discussing Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
(1978), stating "the Court relied heavily on the two-parent paradigm and chose the 
'better' father-a man who had demonstrated greater commitment to the child. The 
Court did not consider the possibility of preserving parental rights for two men"). Fur­
thermore, the typical "American Family" is considered to be comprised of a husband, 
wife, and 2.5 children. Kinna Patel, Comment, Neglecting the Child: The Role of Race 
and Sexual Orientation in Adoption Proceedings, 4 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 41, 41 
(2002); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 850 (11th ed. 2005) 
(defining "nuclear family" as "a family group that consists only of father, mother, and 
children"); Silverman, supra note 2, at 417-18 ("The marriage-centered nuclear family 
has traditionally served as the bastion for securing American family values ...."). 
79. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 
2005). In Elisa B. the court stated, "'whenever possible, a child should have the benefit 
of two parents to support and nurture him or her.''' Id. (quoting Librers v. Black, 28 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005»; see also Alison Harvison Young, Recon­
ceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GEN. 
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lies are statistically more likely to become high academic achievers, 
to have greater access to money, and are less likely to become in­
volved in crime than children from one-parent homes.8o Practically 
speaking, some courts have taken the stance that in paternity or 
custody determinations "the legal paradigm is that of two legal par­
ents."81 In so doing, it is the common goal of these courts to pro­
vide the child with two legal parents, a goal for which they will go to 
"great lengths" to achieve.82 Therefore, the two-legal-parents con­
cept is more than a mere presumption, it is the starting point for 
many courts in determining familial rights. 
4. The Best Interests of the Child 
In deciding paternity cases, many courts find that the "best in­
terests of the child" are paramount, eclipsing to all other concerns, 
including the rights and desires of the other parties involved.83 Ap­
plication of this standard is determined on a case-by-case basis, 
often in conjunction with other legal standards, to provide an out­
come that is not only in the child's best interest, but is also equita­
ble to the other parties involved.84 In cases where more than one 
man is asserting paternity, some courts have used the "best interests 
of the child" standard as part of their determination.85 The best 
DER Soc. POL'y & L. 505, 539 (1998) ("[T]he dominant paradigm of the exclusive 
family: the child has no more than two parents, leaving the question of who gets cut 
out."); Stone, supra note 68, at 516. 
80. Karl Zinsmeister, Parental Responsibility and the Future of the American Fam­
ily,77 CORNELL L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (1992). Zinsmeister observed that "[a] major 
study by the National Association of Elementary School Principals found that children 
from Single-parent families were half as likely to be high academic achievers, compared 
to two-parent counterparts, and more than half again as likely to be low achievers." Id. 
at 1006. Furthermore, "[sJeventy percent of juveniles now in state reform institutions 
grew up in single-parent or no-parent families." Id. at 1007. 
81. Meyer, supra note 20, at 133 (quoting V.c. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 
2000». 
82. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional 
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 469 (1990). 
83. Epstein, supra note 56, at 663. 
84. Id. at 665 (discussing Topper v. Topper, 553 A.2d 639 (Del. 1988) (unpub­
lished disposition); Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002». 
85. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 366 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) ("[W]hen presump­
tions of paternity arise in more than one potential father, trial courts must take the best 
interests of the child into account as part of policy and logic in resolving competing 
presumptions."). But see Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2000) ("A determination of the best interests of the child in ordering the requested 
testing, or in the consideration of paternity, whether original or revised, is inappropri­
ate."). The standard has also been used to determine if a putative father is allowed to 
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interests of the child standard, while unpredictable because of the 
judge's vast discretion and reliance on the facts of the case, is often 
decisive in any action to establish parentage. 
In sum, principles involving the presumption of legitimacy, the 
biological parent-child relationship, the two-parent paradigm, and 
the best interests of the child standard remain crucial in parentage 
determinations.86 These principles consistently provide guidance in 
an area of law that is constantly changing. 
C. Interpretation of the Uniform Parentage Act 
Courts have been clear-a legal parent does not necessarily 
need to be biologically related to the child.87 For example, in 
Michael H., the Supreme Court held that a biological father of a 
child whose natural mother was married to another man during the 
child's conception and birth, did not have a constitutionally pro­
tected liberty interest in a relationship with the child.88 Instead, the 
mother's husband was held to be the child's legal father.89 Since 
Michael H., courts have declared, under provisions of the UPA, le­
gal parentage in persons who have no biological parental relation­
ship with the child.90 This subpart will discuss the four primary 
situations in which this happens: (1) surrogacy agreements,91 (4) 
persons raising a child to whom they have no biological parental 
relationship,92 (3) stepfathers,93 and (4) same-sex coparents.94 
rebut the presumption of legitimacy and order blood tests to determine paternity. Ban 
v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
86. Appleton, supra note 58, at 228 (presumption of legitimacy); Hill, supra note 
21, at 370 (biology); Jacobs, supra note 78, at 834 (two-parent paradigm); Epstein, supra 
note 56, at 663 (best interests of the child). 
87. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989); L.A. County 
Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 13-14 
(Cal. 2004); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia e. (In re Karen 
c.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
88. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124. 
89. Id. In Michael H., "[t]he state's policy of treating the marital presumption as 
conclusive ... was justified by its interest in protecting both marriage and the child's 
established bonds within the intact marital family from external disruption." Meyer, 
supra note 20, at 128; see also Stone, supra note 68, at 508. 
90. See, e.g., Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador 
M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2007); see also In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677. 
91. See infra Part I.e.1; see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); 
Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 1994). 
92. See infra Part I.e.2; see also In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705; In re 
Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677. 
93. See infra Part I.C.3; see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. 
Heriberto e. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 6 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs. 
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1. Surrogacy Agreements 
The UPA was amended in 2000 and 2002 to account for ad­
vances in medicine and technology, specifically the rise of artificial 
reproduction, and to expand the definitions of maternity and pater­
nity.95 However, even prior to its amendment, the Supreme Court 
of California applied the UPA to a situation that was not consid­
ered when it was drafted.96 In Johnson v. Calvert, the court used 
provisions of the UPA to settle a parentage dispute between a hus­
band and wife, who were both genetically related to the child, and 
the woman who gave birth to the child as a gestational surrogate.97 
Specifically, the court had to determine who the mother was-the 
person who gave birth to the child or the other person whose egg 
was used in the child's creation and who intended to raise the 
child.98 The court declined to treat this case as one involving con­
flicting presumptions of maternity or weigh the evidence of both 
parties.99 The court instead made a legal determination pursuant to 
California's UPA provisions that when both the genetic relationship 
with the child and gestation of the child do not abide in one woman, 
the woman who intended to create and raise the child is the legal 
mother. lOO In so doing, the court specifically noted that it was ap-
Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 2002); N.A.H. v. 
S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
94. See infra Part LCA; see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 
117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006). 
95. Meyer, supra note 20, at 129. 
96. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
97. [d. at 782; see also Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (holding that a husband and wife were the legal parents of a child born from their 
surrogacy agreement and neither the husband nor the wife was biologically related to 
the child). Johnson is significant because the court applied the UPA to a situation that 
was unforeseen when it was drafted. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 ("Passage of the Act 
clearly was not motivated by the need to resolve surrogacy disputes, which were virtu­
ally unknown in 1975. Yet it facially applies to any parentage determination, including 
the rare case in which a child's maternity is in issue."). 
98. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
99. [d. at 781. 
100. [d. at 782; see also Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 
1994) (declaring, in a surrogacy situation, the biological parents as legal parents over 
the surrogate host and determining that an adoption by the biological parents was not 
necessary using a simple genetic standard). See generally Hill, supra note 21, at 370 
(stating that traditionally the gestational mother has been determined the legal mother, 
however, "while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not the sine qua non 
of motherhood .. " It is possible that the common law viewed genetic consanguinity as 
the basis for maternal rights .... [G]estation simply would be irrefutable evidence of 
the more fundamental genetic relationship" (citations omitted)). Since Johnson v. Cal­
vert, the UPA was amended to include that a mother and child relationship could be 
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plying the UPA to a situation that was unforeseen when the UPA 
was drafted.1OI The court's determination of a surrogacy agreement 
controversy in accordance with the UPA is significant because it 
recognized that two women can have standing in a maternity dis­
pute and provides an example of how courts have applied the UPA 
in situations that were not envisioned by its original drafters.102 
2. Recognizing Nonbiological Parents 
Courts have interpreted the UPA to allow a parent without a 
biological relationship with the child to have standing and even to 
recognize a parent-child relationship in situations where the parent 
and child have a significant familial relationship.lo3 In Librers v. 
Black, the court granted standing as a presumed father to Joseph, a 
man who lived with the child's biological mother during conception 
and held the child out as his own.104 The court examined evidence 
that Joseph held the child out as his own, including the fact that 
Joseph signed a declaration of paternity, the child had Joseph's last 
name, and the child believed Joseph was her father.l°5 Conse­
quently, the court explicitly stated that because Joseph qualified as 
a presumed father, the fact that he was not biologically related to 
the child had no bearing on the issue of standing.106 
established by "an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a 
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable 
under other law." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(4) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 
(Supp. 2007). Other jurisdictions that have not adopted the UPA have reached similar 
results. See, e.g., Soos v. Superior Court of Ariz., 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1994) 
(holding a statute that granted legal maternity to a surrogate but created a rebuttable 
presumption of paternity in the surrogate's husband to be unconstitutional on grounds 
of equal protection); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 
(Mass. 2001) (granting the request of the plaintiffs-the genetic parents and the gesta­
tional surrogate-to declare the genetic parents the legal parents of the twins and for 
the hospital to list their names and not the name of the surrogate on the twins' birth 
certificates); Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. 1994) (declaring legal 
maternity in the genetic mother, not the gestational mother). 
101. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
102. Id. "Not uncommonly, courts must construe statutes in factual settings not 
contemplated by the enacting legislature." Id. 
103. See Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. 
v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (granting 
standing in a maternity action to the woman who cared for the child and remanding for 
a determination of parentage). 
104. Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
105. Id. at 190, 193, 196. 
106. /d. at 197. 
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Moreover, in Los Angeles County Department of Children and 
Family Services v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), the California Court 
of Appeal found that a woman with no biological relationship to 
the child had standing in a maternity action as a presumed 
mother.107 In Karen c., Karen was born to a married couple who 
then gave her to Leticia C.108 Although she never formally adopted 
her, Leticia raised Karen as her own child.109 In its decision, the 
court interpreted the presumed father provisions of California's 
VPA110 to be gender neutral, thus giving Leticia standing as a pre­
sumed mother.111 The court then remanded the case to the juvenile 
court for a determination of whether it was "an appropriate action" 
to allow the absence of a genetic relationship to rebut the presump­
tion of Leticia's parentage.H2 Karen C. is significant because it 
holds that a parent with no biological relationship to the child, and 
no legal relationship through adoption, can have standing and pos­
sibly be a legal parent if the court deems it to be an "appropriate 
action."1l3 Even more importantly, the court held that paternity 
presumptions also apply to maternity actions.114 
In addition, in Kern County Department of Human Services v. 
Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), the California Court of Appeal al­
lowed a child's half-sister to assert standing as a presumed parent 
where the half-sister took the child into her home and held herself 
out to the child, but not to the rest of her family, as the child's 
mother.115 The court, in stating that "[t]he paternity presumptions 
are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state's interest in 
the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family," interpreted 
107. In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677. 
lOS. Id. at 677-7S. The biological mother told the hospital that she was Leticia so 
that Leticia's name would be on Karen's birth certificate. Id. at 67S. 
109. Id. Leticia never formally adopted Karen. Id. 
110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004). 
111. In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677. "Insofar as practicable, the provi­
sions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply [to the mother 
and child relationship]." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a). 
112. In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6S1. The court had significant deference 
to hold a case to be an appropriate action to allow a rebuttal of the presumption of 
paternity, or in this case maternity. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 70S (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The court first stated that she had standing 
because she was an aggrieved party in the preceding action. Id. Subsequently the court 
stated that she openly held the child out to be her own after the child's biological 
mother had passed away. Id. at 70S-09. 
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the UPA to be gender neutral.116 The court reasoned that the 
child's half-sister was a presumed parent because the child "be­
lieved" that the half-sister was his mother, and the fact that other 
people knew otherwise did not rebut her status as a presumed par­
ent.117 Furthermore, the court held that this was not appropriate 
for the presumption of parentage to be rebutted because to do so 
would render the child without a family, and maintaining the famil­
ial relationship is a compelling state interest.118 In summary, 
Librers, Karen c., and Salvador M. are significant because they 
hold that biology is not the determinative factor when establishing 
standing in maternity actions where there are no competing claims 
to parentage.119 
3. Stepfathers 
A stepfather is held to be a presumed father under the UPA in 
two ways: either by "receiv[ing] the child into his home and openly 
hold[ing] out the child as his natural child"120 or by benefiting from 
the presumption of legitimacy.l2l For example, if a wife conceives a 
child through an extramarital relationship, her husband will be con­
sidered a presumed father under the UPA if he is either married to 
the wife at the time of conception, or receives the child into his 
home and openly holds the child out as his natural child.122 
In interpreting the UPA, courts have held that neither the pre­
sumption of legitimacy nor the presumption of biology is conclu­
sive.123 This nonconclusiveness is further demonstrated by the fact 
that a stepfather's admission that he has no biological connection to 
the child does not automatically rebut the presumption.124 
An example of a court granting a stepfather standing can be 
seen in Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 
116. /d. at 708. 
117. Id. at 708-09. 
118. /d. at 709. 
119. Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); In re Salva­
dor M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708-09; In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681. 
120. VNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 4(a)(4) (1973), 9B V.L.A. 394 (2001). 
121. Id. § 4(a)(1). 
122. VNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a)(1), (5) (amended 2002), 9B V.L.A. 16-17 
(Supp. 2007). 
123. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa 
V.), 85 P.3d 2,14 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In 
re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 
2000) (en banc). 
124. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 933-34. 
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Services v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V. ).125 In that case, Jesusa was 
born to her mother and her biological father, Heriberto C.126 Dur­
ing Jesusa's conception her mother was living with Heriberto, not 
with her husband, Paul.127 The action was brought when Heriberto 
raped and battered Jesusa's mother.128 This incident placed 
Jesusa's mother in the hospital and Heriberto in jail.129 Paul took 
Jesusa in and petitioned for paternity.130 Subsequently, Heriberto 
also petitioned for paternity.l3l The court determined that both 
Heriberto and Paul fulfilled the statutory requirement of a pre­
sumed father under California Family Code section 7611 and 
granted both men standing.132 
At trial, the court weighed the competing interests and held 
that Paul's presumption was indeed greater.133 The court deter­
mined that Paul had a substantial relationship with Jesusa: he had 
been married to her mother for eighteen years, he was the father of 
her five half-siblings, Jesusa stayed with him almost every weekend, 
and both she and her mother resided with him when her mother 
was having difficulties with Heriberto.134 The court further stated 
that Heriberto's interests were merely bioiogicaP35 and not in 
Jesusa's best interests.B6 The court agreed with the juvenile court 
that" 'there is so much more to being a father than merely planting 
the biological seed. The man who provides stability, nurturance, 
family ties, permanence, is more important to a child than the man 
who has mere biological ties.' "137 
The Colorado Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 
N.A.H. v. S.L.S.138 In N.A.H., S.R.H. was born to her biological 
mother during her ongoing marriage.B9 The husband's name was 
125. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2. 
126. Id. at 6. 
127. Id. at 7. 
128. Id. at 6. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 7. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 11. 
133. Id. at 15. 
134. Id. at 13. 
135. Id. at 14. 
136. Id. at 29. Family Services had filed a dependency petition to remove Jesusa 
based on Heriberto's abuse of her mother, claiming that Jesusa witnessed that abuse 
and that their home was unsuitable to live in. Id. at 6. 
137. Id. at 15 (quoting the juvenille court's unreported opinion). 
138. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
139. Id. at 357. 
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placed on the birth certificate and he accepted the child into his 
home and held her out as his own child.140 However, during the 
time that S.R.H. was conceived, her mother was having an extra­
marital affair with the biological father. 141 When the mother and 
husband reconciled, the mother terminated the biological father's 
visitation and the biological father sued for paternity.142 Genetic 
testing proved that the husband was not the biological father.143 
However, the court granted both the biological father and the hus­
band standing and held that "a question of paternity is not automat­
ically resolved by biological testing, but rather calls upon the courts 
to consider the best interests of the child in analyzing policy and 
logic as directed by the statute."144 The case was then remanded 
for a determination of whether it was in the best interests of the 
child to allow the genetic evidence to rebut the presumption of le­
gitimacy.145 In re Jesusa V. and N.A.H. are important because the 
courts interpreted the UPA to allow a stepfather, who undeniably 
had no biological connection to the child, to have standing as a pre­
sumed parent and could be determined to be the legal parent.146 
4. Same-Sex Parents 
A significant step in· the evolution of defining parentage has 
involved cases where a same-sex coparent has petitioned for mater­
nity.147 In Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, Califor­
nia's one-mother principle was challenged by a lesbian coparent, 
Emily, who wanted her former partner, Elisa, to be declared a legal 
parent to her biological children.148 Emily and Elisa planned to 
build a family together and to have children by artificial insemina­
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 358. 
143. Id. at 359. 
144. Id. at 357. Other courts have come to similar conclusions. Id. at 361 n.5. 
(citing Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 963 P.2d 1135,1155 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1998); Witso v. Overby (In re Witso), 609 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); 
K.E.N. v. R.c. (In re K.E.N.), 513 N.W.2d 892, 897 (N.D. 1994». 
145. Id. at 366. 
146. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa 
V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11, 15-16 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 358, 361. 
147. These cases fly in the face of California's principle that a child can only have 
one mother. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (one-mother 
principle). 
148. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 
2005). 
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tion,149 Moreover, they chose the same donor so that their children 
would be biologically related.150 Elisa gave birth to Chance, and 
Emily gave birth to twins, Ry and Kaia.151 The children were raised 
as siblings and referred to both Emily and Elisa as their mothers.152 
When Emily and Elisa separated, the trial court initially ordered 
Elisa to pay child support to Emily and the twins.153 The California 
Court of Appeal dismissed the suit and stated that "Elisa had no 
obligation to pay child support because she was not a parent of the 
twins within the meaning of the Uniform Parentage ACt."154 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that a child can have two mothers.155 The court came to this con­
clusion by factually distinguishing the case from Johnson. 156 In 
Johnson, three potential parents had stepped forward-the biologi­
cal father, the biological mother, and the gestational mother­
whereas in this case only two parents had stepped forward, and the 
issue was whether the child's two legal parents could both be wo­
men.157 The court proceeded to apply a gender-neutral reading of 
California Family Code section 7611 and determined that Elisa had 
"received the twins into her home and openly held them out as her 
natural children. "158 The significance of this decision is twofold: It 
dispensed with the principle that a child can only have one legal 
mother159 and it applied a gender-neutral interpretation of Califor­
nia Family Code section 7611 to recognize a woman as a presumed 
parent.160 
149. Id. at 663. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 662-63. 
152. Id. at 663. 
153. Id. at 664. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 666. 
156. Id.; see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)). 
157. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666. 
158. Id. at 667; see also Jacobs, supra note 78, at 819 ("More recently, courts have 
applied the intent test to legalize the parentage of non-biological lesbian co-parents. "). 
159. See generally Manternache, supra note 32, at 401. In deciding Johnson, the 
court adhered to the two-parent family principle in that "the facts of the Johnson case 
are distinguishable from a situation where a non biological lesbian mother is vying for a 
parentage determination .... [In Johnson] a determination of parentage of the surro­
gate mother would have given the child three parents from two separate families." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
160. See Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(reversing the trial court's determination that a same-sex parent lacked standing be­
cause, under Elisa B., a former same-sex coparent may be able to establish parentage 
via a gender-neutral application of CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004) if the parent 
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II. CASE DISCUSSION OF AMY G. v. M. W. 
Despite the aforementioned decisions declaring parentage in 
persons who were not biologically related to the child, the court in 
Amy G. refrained from interpreting the UPA to be gender neutral 
and refused a stepmother's request to have standing in a maternity 
case.161 In Amy G., the court held that Amy G., as a stepmother, 
did not have standing because the child's biological mother was also 
asserting maternity.162 In effect, this denied stepmothers the right 
to notice and opportunity to be heard in parentage determinations, 
a right that has been afforded to stepfathers for years.163 This Part 
details the facts and procedural posture of the case, the arguments 
presented by both parties, and the court's reasoning. 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Nathan was born in May 2003, to his father (G.G.) and biologi­
cal mother (M.W.).l64 At the time of Nathan's conception and 
throughout his gestational period, G.G. was married to Amy G.165 
For the first month of Nathan's life, he resided with M.W. in Vir­
ginia.166 In June 2003, his father traveled from California to Vir­
ginia to take Nathan to live with him.167 During this visit, M.W. 
signed a custody and adoption agreement providing that G.G. 
would have sole custody, M.W. would not have any rights to visita-
received the child into her home and openly held the child out as her own). Other 
courts have interpreted parentage statutes to legally recognize the parentage of same­
sex couples. See, e.g., In Re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A2d 1036 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 2005) (holding that a same-sex parent of a child born to her partner via artificial 
insemination is a legal mother using a gender-neutral application of the Artificial In­
semination Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002)); Carvin v. Britain (In re 
Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) (hold­
ing that a same-sex parent had standing for a determination of coparentage where the 
child was only biologically related to her former partner). 
161. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 309-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review 
denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29,2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2007). 
162. [d. at 310. 
163. See generally L.A County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. 
(In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. 
Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002); N.AH. v. S.L.S., 9 
P.3d 354, 354-55 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
164. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 298-99. 
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tion, and M.W. would consent to Amy G. adopting Nathan.168 
From that point on, Nathan resided with his father and Amy G.169 
In September 2003, M.W. filed a petition against G.G. seeking 
to establish a parental relationship with Nathan.170 G.G. then re­
quested a judgment of parentage to recognize Amy G. as Nathan's 
legal mother and filed a motion to join Amy G. as a necessary party 
to the action pI After G.G.'s request to join Amy G. was denied, 
Amy G. filed a separate petition to contest maternity as an inter­
ested person pursuant to California Family Code section 7650(a).l72 
The trial court granted M.W.'s motion to quash and dismissed Amy 
G.'s action.173 Amy G. and G.G. appealed this decision.174 While 
Amy G. was pursuing her own action, G.G. again moved to join 
Amy G. to the action commenced by M.Wps When the trial court 
denied G.G's motion to join Amy G., he filed a petition for a writ 
of prohibition seeking to vacate the trial court's order and to allow 
Amy G. to join the actionP6 The California Court of Appeal con­
solidated the appeal from Amy G.'s action and G.G.'s petition in 
M.W.'s action.177 On August 17, 2006, the court filed its decision 
denying Amy G. and G.G.'s motion and petition.178 Amy G. and 
G.G.'s subsequent petition for review was denied on November 29, 
2006.179 Furthermore, their writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court was also denied. I80 
168. [d. 
169. [d. at 300. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. 
172. [d. "Any interested person may bring an action to determine the existence 
or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 
2004). On February 9, 2004, M.W. received monitored visitation with Nathan for four 
hours per week. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 300. 
173. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 300. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. G.G. also sought to join Steven, M.W's husband at the time of Nathan's 
conception and birth. However, Steven filed a responsive declaration in which he 
stated that he had no desire to become a party to the action and would sign a waiver 
relinquishing his rights to a paternity claim. Id. at 300-01. 
176. Id. at 299-300. 
177. Id. at 299. 
178. Id. 
179. Amy G. v. M.W., No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29,2006), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007). 
180. Amy G. v. M.W., 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007). 
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B. Plaintiffs' Arguments 
Amy G. and G.G. presented several arguments concerning 
why Amy G. should have been afforded standing or joined as a 
necessary party to the action. First, they contended that Amy G. 
should have been treated similarly to a stepfather and granted 
standing under a gender-neutral application of the UPA.181 Sec­
ond, they argued that maternity determinations, like paternity deci­
sions, should not be decided solely on the basis of biology.182 
Finally, they asserted that the court should have decided the issue 
of Amy G.'s standing before discussing the merits of the action.l83 
1. Amy G.'s Situation Is Analogous to that of a Stepfather 
Amy G. and G.G. argued that Amy G. should have been 
granted standing because, since she was married to the child's bio­
logical father at the time of Nathan's conception,184 her situation 
was analogous to one in which a stepfather would be joined in an 
action for paternity.l85 Because of the marital presumption, stepfa­
thers have standing by proof of marriage to the biological mother 
during the child's conception.186 Since Amy G.'s situation is similar 
to that of stepfathers who have been afforded standing, Amy G. 
should have been granted standing under a gender-neutral interpre­
tation of the UPA.l87 
Furthermore, Amy G. and G.G. argued that it is practical to 
apply the presumed father statutes to maternity actions.188 This ar­
gument is one of statutory construction. California Family Code 
section 7650 states that paternity provisions apply equally to mater­
181. See Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 301, 303-04. 
182. Appellants' Reply Brief at 16, Amy G. v. M.W., 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 
(Cal. 2006) (No. S146841). 
183. Petition for Review at 35-37, Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (Nos. B182101, B187828). 
184. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 7. 
185. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302 (stating that joinder is required when "that 
person's absence from the action could impair that person's interest"). In addition, 
they argued that Amy G. should have standing as an interested person "because she 
claim[ed] to be Nathan's mother." Id. Any "interested person" has standing in a ma­
ternityaction. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2004). 
186. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 6-7; see also L.A. County 
Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 
2004). 
187. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302-03. The portions of the UPA that apply to 
paternity are equally applicable to maternity. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) 
(West 2004)). 
188. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 22 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650). 
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nity provisions, "[i]nsofar as practicable."189 Amy G. argued, "If 
the legislature had intended birth mothers to always prevail in ma­
ternity cases involving competing claims, it could have said so with 
clarity and precision, rather than incorporating the presumed-father 
laws into maternity law by reference."190 Therefore, because prac­
ticability does not require that biology trump other considerations 
in maternity actions, requiring such an effect ignores that the stat­
ute clearly states that paternity provisions apply to maternity 
determinations. I91 
Additionally, Amy G. and G.G. argued that Amy G. should 
have had standing under a gender-neutral application of the UPA 
because she should benefit from the presumption of legitimacy.I92 
Under that presumption, codified in California Family Code section 
7611, Nathan is presumed to be a child of the intact marriage.193 
Therefore, Amy should have a claim to custody and thus should be 
joined.I94 
2. Biology Is Not Determinative 
Amy G. and G.G. argued that Amy G. should have been 
granted standing because biology and gender are not determinative 
of legal parentage. They stated, 
Because biological parenthood is not required for a man to have 
standing to assert his legal parentage, and to win recognition as a 
legal parent over the claims of a biological father, the absence of 
biological ties can't bar a similarly-situated woman from stand­
ing, and from winning recognition of her legal parenthood over 
the claims of a biological mother. I95 
Furthermore, they argued that in In re Nicholas H. and In re Jesusa 
V., biology was not the deciding factor in nonsurrogacy cases.I96 
Therefore, biology should not have been the deciding factor in this 
case.I97 
189. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650. 
190. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 22. 
191. ld. 
192. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303. 
193. ld. 
194. See id. 
195. Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 16. 
196. ld. at 18; see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Her­
iberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 14 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs. 
Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002). 
197. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 16. 
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3. Standing Should Have Been Decided Before the Merits 
The court held that Amy G. lacked standing because she could 
not be Nathan's mother.198 In so doing, Amy G. and G.G. declared 
that the court decided the issue of standing by deciding the merits 
of the claim.199 This decision denied Amy G. notice and an oppor­
tunity to be heard on the merits of her claim.20o They stated that 
this is contrary to prior California case law in which persons with a 
fostered parental relationship have standing to be heard at a trial 
on the merits.201 Thus, Amy G. and G.G. argued that the court 
should have granted Amy G., the woman who had raised Nathan 
since infancy, standing so that her views could be heard before a 
decision was rendered on the merits.202 
C. Defendant's Arguments 
M.W. argued that the court was correct in holding that Amy G. 
did not have standing and could not be joined as a necessary party 
because all of Amy G. and G.G.'s claims were grounded in the as­
sertion that Amy G. could be Nathan's mother.203 Since M.W.'s 
biological maternity was uncontested, she stated that Amy G. could 
not be a presumed mother under California Family Code section 
7611 because under California law a child can only have one 
mother.204 
M.W. argued that it is consistent, in light of the UPA's purpose 
of preventing unequal treatment of children based on their parents' 
marital status, to treat biological mothers differently than biological 
fathers.205 She discussed how there is an innate difference between 
biological fathers and biological mothers in that "[w]here a child is 
born out of wedlock, the identity of the father is often unclear. The 
198. See Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307. 
199. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 36 ("The result of that holding is that 
trial courts can determine ... that a party's claim to parental status has no merit, with­
out first joining the claimant as a party."). 
200. Id. at 35. 
201. Id. at 36 (citing Perez v. Dep't of Health, 138 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1977)); see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re 
Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
202. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 36. 
203. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303. 
204. /d. at 304. 
205. Respondent's Brief and Brief in Further Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Prohibition at 22, Amy G. v. M.W., 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. 2006) (No. S146841) 
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. 
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identity of the mother is seldom unclear."206 Since biological ma­
ternity is almost always certain, the only situation that warrants 
granting standing in a maternity case to a nonbiological mother is 
when the biological mother is not asserting her claim.207 
D. The Court's HoLding 
The court distinguished the cases upon which Amy G. and 
G.G. relied, holding that this was not a situation where the court 
should apply the presumptions of paternity to women.208 The court 
held that both In re Karen C. 209 and In re SaLvador M.21O were dis­
tinguishable because in those cases there was no competing claim to 
maternity.211 The court also held that ELisa B. was distinguishable 
because, in that case, the Supreme Court of California only recog­
nized two parents (although both of them were women).212 In this 
case, the court would have had to recognize three parents: G.G., 
Amy G., and M.W.213 
Furthermore, the court determined that In re Jesusa V. was not 
applicable to this case, because there were no competing claims of 
maternity since M.W. was Nathan's biological mother.214 Structur­
ally, there is no framework in the UPA to weigh competing claims 
of maternity like there is for competing claims of paternity.2Is This 
is due to the fact that where the biological relationship of the 
mother is uncontested, maternity is determined.216 
In light of the arguments proposed by each of the parties, the 
court decided that Amy G. did not have standing.217 The court 
based its decision in the fact that the identity of Nathan's biological 
maternity was not contested.218 Therefore Amy G. could not be 
206. [d. at 23 (emphasis omitted). 
207. See id. 
208. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304. 
209. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen 
C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
210. Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
211. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304. 
212. [d. at 305; see Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660 
(Cal. 2005). 
213. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305. 
214. [d. at 306; L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. 
(In re Jesusa Y.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
215. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004). 
216. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306. 
217. [d. at 309-10. 
218. [d. 
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Nathan's mother or presumed mother.219 However, this Note ar­
gues that Amy G. should have received standing through a gender­
neutral interpretation of the UPA because courts should not treat 
her any differently from stepparents or same-sex coparents who are 
in similar situations. 
III. A STEPMOTHER CAN HAVE STANDING IN A MATERNITY 

SUIT THROUGH A GENDER-NEUTRAL INTERPRETATION 

OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 

This Part considers why Amy G. should have received standing 
as an interested person through a gender-neutral application of the 
UPA. This issue is important for several reasons. First, if gender 
roles were reversed, a stepfather would have had standing.220 For 
example, a stepfather would have had standing in a paternity action 
where the child was a result of his wife's extramarital affair with the 
biological father, and the stepfather had taken the child into his 
home and held the child out as his own.221 Thus, but for Amy G. 
being a woman, she would have been granted standing. Second, if 
Amy G. had no biological relationship with Nathan, but had taken 
care of the child all of his life and there were no other possible 
parental figures, Amy G. would have standing in a maternity ac­
tion.222 Third, a same-sex coparent petitioning for maternity of a 
child born to her partner through alternative reproduction technol­
ogy would have standing.223 Finally, if the court had granted Amy 
G. standing, the door would have been opened for other stepmoth­
ers to have standing in maternity actions. 
This Note argues that there is no difference between stepmoth­
ers and stepfathers, same-sex coparents, and persons who have no 
biological relationship to the child but have cared for the child as 
219. Id. at 310. 
220. See generally L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. 
(In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en 
banc). 
221. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 7. 
222. Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica O. (In re Salvador M.), 4 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. 
v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (remanding an 
order that denied a child's petition for a mother-child relationship where the child was 
taken in and cared for by a nonrelative woman). 
223. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) 
(holding that Elisa B., as the biological mother's partner, was a presumed parent to 
Emily's biological children Ry and Kaia, who were conceived using a sperm donor, 
because she actively participated in causing the children'S conception, accepted the obli­
gations of parenthood, and no competing claims of a second parent existed). 
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the sole parental figure. This analysis will focus solely on Amy G.'s 
standing to assert her claim for maternity and to be joined as an 
interested party.224 Part lILA discusses how Nathan can have three 
parents for the purposes of standing and how the court should have 
distinguished between the issues of standing and the merits of the 
action. Part IILB discusses how biology is not conclusive in parent­
age determinations and should not automatically govern when de­
termining standing in maternity actions. Part IILe compares Amy 
G.'s case with Elisa B. and leads to the conclusion that Nathan can 
have two mothers for the purposes of standing. Part IILD analyzes 
how the marital presumption is applied with a gender bias and de­
termines that it should be applied equally when the husband is bio­
logically related to the child and the wife is not, as when the wife is 
biologically related to the child and the husband is not. Finally, 
Part IILE analyzes how courts can weigh both Amy G.'s claim as a 
224. This Note does not discuss whether Amy G. would have been declared Na­
than's legal mother if she were determined to have standing, if the court should have 
recognized and declared that Nathan had two legal mothers, or if the court's decision 
violated Amy G.'s procedural due process or equal protection rights under the Four­
teenth Amendment. See generally Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307-08 (holding that the 
denial of Amy G.'s standing and joinder claims did not violate her rights under the 
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). This Note 
does not discuss other legal options that stepparents-or others with a parental rela­
tionship with a child-can pursue to acquire certain rights regarding custody and visita­
tion with the child. See generally, e.g., Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 
P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) (acknowledging the common 
law status of a de facto parent as a person who has performed a parent-like role in the 
child's life, and with that status has standing to petition the court for other rights and 
obligations associated with parentage); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and 
One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 
BUFF. L. REV. 341, 359-63 (2002) (discussing how courts have used the psychological 
parent status and the parent-like relationship status to accord visitation rights to nonbi­
ological lesbian coparents); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't 
Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 865 (2003) (discussing the rights acquired with the quasi-parent status); Survey of 
2004-2005 Developments in Alabama Caselaw, 57 ALA. L. REV. 567, 613 (2005) (dis­
cussing the new requirements adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court to acquire in 
loco parentis status, "[fjirst, the non-parent must, without legally adopting a child, as­
sume parental obligations. Second, the non-parent must voluntarily provide for the 
child" (citing Smith v. Smith, 922 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2005) (footnotes omitted))). Further­
more, this Note does not address how a parent may be estopped from petitioning for a 
paternity determination. See generally, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255 (Haw. 2002) 
(holding that a mother was estopped from filing a petition for paternity where she had 
affirmatively asserted that the presumed father was the natural father of her child); In 
re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (holding that a father was estopped 
from setting aside a judgment of paternity when he had voluntarily acknowledged pa­
ternity five years prior to the genetic determination that he was not the biological 
father). 
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presumed mother and M.W.'s claim as a biological mother through 
a gender-neutral reading of the UPA's paternity provisions. This 
analysis leads to the conclusion that a stepmother should be granted 
the same rights as a stepfather or same-sex coparent, and should 
have standing in a maternity action through a gender-neutral inter­
pretation of the UPA. 
A. Nathan Can Have Three Parents for the Purposes of Standing 
In Amy G., the court decided that Amy G. did not have stand­
ing because she could not be Nathan's mother.225 In so doing, the 
court decided the issues of standing and maternity simultaneously. 
This subpart proposes that the court should have (1) distinguished 
between standing and the determination of parentage, and (2) 
found that Amy G. was an interested person and should have been 
given standing or joined in the maternity action. 
1. 	 The California Court Should Have Distinguished 
Between Standing and the Parentage 
Determination 
The court should have first determined whether Amy G. had 
standing and, if she did, then determined whether she could be Na­
than's mother.226 The court's decision in Amy G. was simple: Amy 
G. cannot have standing because she cannot be Nathan's mother.227 
The result of this determination was that the court decided the mer­
its of the case before deciding standing.228 This denied Amy G. no­
tice and opportunity to be heard, which has been afforded to others 
in similar situations where courts recognized three potential parents 
for the purposes of standing only and then made a legal maternity 
determination at trial.229 
225. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310. 
226. It is common practice for issues of standing to be decided before the merits. 
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-21 (1989) (holding that a biological 
father did not have standing when he moved for a blood test of a child born into an 
intact marriage, between the biological mother and her husband, because the only ones 
who could bring the paternity action under section 621 of the California Evidence Code 
were the husband or wife). 
227. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310. 
228. See Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 36. 
229. See id.; see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto 
C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en 
banc). 
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a. 	 By declaring that Amy G. did not have standing because she 
could not be Nathan's mother, the court decided the 
merits of the action, not standing 
As a general principle, the issue of standing must be decided 
before a court hears the merits of a particular action.230 In Librers 
v. Black, the California Court of Appeal decided that the district 
court had erred by deciding the case on the merits without first de­
termining standing-in effect "putting the cart before the horse. "231 
In Librers, the district court denied standing to a man who was liv­
ing with the child's mother, who was married to another man during 
conception, "for the very reason that it had already determined that 
[he] was not a presumed father. "232 In doing so, the district court 
looked at two factors: "biology [and] depth of bond."233 However, 
the factors to determine whether a man is a presumed father in­
clude more than biology and depth of bond, such as being married 
to the mother at the time of conception and openly holding the 
child out as one's own child.234 Therefore the California Court of 
Appeal reversed because the man had produced adequate evidence 
that he held the child out as his own. The court held that he did 
have standing, and remanded for a determination of legal 
paternity.235 
However, in denying Amy G. standing, the California Court of 
Appeal used similar reasoning as the district court in Librers .236 
The Amy G. court said that the "father and Amy's arguments are 
all predicated on Amy's claim that she is Nathan's mother. There­
fore our threshold question is whether Amy can assert status as Na­
230. Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("A litigant's 
standing to sue is a threshold issue to be resolved before the matter can be reached on 
the merits." (quoting Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. of L.A., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 474, 
479 (2005))); accord Said v. Jegan, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
231. Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197. 
232. [d. 
233. [d. at 195. 
234. [d.; see supra Part 1.B.1-.3 (discussing the importance of the marital pre­
sumption, the two-parent paradigm, and biology in parentage determinations). 
235. Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197. 
236. Compare Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
("Because Amy cannot legally be Nathan's mother under these circumstances, Amy 
cannot 'c\aim[] an interest relating to the subject of the action ....'" (quoting CAL. 
CIv. PROC. CODE § 389(a) (West 2004))), review denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 
14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007), with Librers, 28 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 195 (stating that the court relied on "biology or depth of bond," which was 
unrelated to standing but related to the merits). 
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than's mother."237 The court stated that a reason to deny Amy G. 
standing was, if she had standing, she would ultimately lose on the 
merits.238 Similar to Librers, the issue should not have been 
whether Amy G. could assert status as Nathan's mother or whether 
she could win at trial, it should have been whether she could assert 
status as a presumed mother.239 By predicating its analysis on 
whether Amy G. could be Nathan's mother, the court put the cart 
before the horse and decided standing by determining the merits of 
the action.240 
b. 	 The court should have granted all three parents standing and 
made a legal determination of maternity at trial 
Amy G., G.G., and M.W. should all have had standing and Na­
than's two legal parents should have been determined at trial. In 
paternity cases where a stepfather asserts a claim that opposes the 
claim of a biological father, courts have granted both men standing 
and determined who the child's two legal parents are from the three 
possible parents.241 For example, in In re Jesusa V., the court al­
lowed both Paul, Jesusa's stepfather, and Heriberto, her biological 
father, to have standing in a paternity action.242 The court found 
that Paul and Heriberto were presumed fathers under California 
Family Code section 7611.243 The identity of Jesusa's biological 
parents was not at issue and, therefore, she had three potential par­
ents for the purposes of standing: her mother, Paul, and Heriberto. 
Both presumed fathers were first granted standing and later given 
an opportunity to be heard at trial where the juvenile court consid­
ered the paternity claims on their merits and determined which pre­
237. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303. 
238. Respondent's Brief, supra note 205, at 40 ("The trial court thus believed that 
even ilhe found that Amy qualified as a presumptive parent under section 7611, subdi­
vision (d), her claim would be defeated by section 7612 because Kim is both the biologi­
cal mother and did not wait a long time to assert per parentage rights." (citing CAL. 
FAM. CODE §§ 7611(d), 7612 (1993». 
239. Cf Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195 ("The relevant inquiry under the statute 
is whether the prospective plaintiff claiming presumed father status under section 7611, 
subdivision (d) can allege facts that bring him within the statutory language of that 
subdivision"). For Amy G. to assert status as a presumed mother, the court would have 
had to interpret the UPA to be gender neutral under California Family Code section 
7650(a). See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a). 
240. Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197. 
241. See generally L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. 
(In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. 
v. Mario A. (In re Kiana A.), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
242. In re Jesusa v., 85 P.3d at 11. 
243. Id. at 7. 
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sumption was weightier pursuant to California Family Code section 
7611.244 The result in In re Jesusa V. was not an isolated incident. 
Many other courts have recognized that two men can concurrently 
qualify as presumed fathers, where the natural mother was not con­
tested, and granted both standing for the determination of who was 
the child's legal father.245 
The situation in Amy G. is virtually identical to In re Jesusa V. 
Nathan has three potential parents for the purposes of standing: his 
father, Amy G., and M.W. The only difference between these two 
cases is that the gender roles are reversed.246 However, a gender 
role reversal does not warrant opposite treatment in regard to 
standing.247 In granting standing to stepfathers while denying the 
same to a similarly situated stepmother, the court is effectively say­
ing that one has a greater interest in the child because of gender 
differences. The court should have avoided this inequitable result 
by treating Amy G. like Paul in In re Jesusa V. by granting her 
standing as an interested party, and subsequently determining 
whether Amy G. or M.W. is Nathan's legal mother by weighing the 
two claims. 
244. Id. at 7-8. It should be noted that Heriberto was not present at the trial 
because he was in jail. Id. at 8. 
245. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (determining parent­
age of a child whose conception was arranged through a surrogacy agreement using the 
husband's sperm and carried by a donor; the husband, wife, and donor were all granted 
standing and the final determination pronounced the husband and wife to be the legal 
parents); In re Kiana A., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675-76 (granting standing to two men who 
fulfilled the requirements for the presumption of paternity, where the mother of the 
child was not contested). Moreover, "Although more than one individual may fulfill 
the criteria that give rise to a presumption of paternity, there can be only one presumed 
father." Id. (citing Brian C. v. Ginger K, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000». 
246. Compare Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(stepmother asserting maternity where a child was conceived through her husband's 
extramarital affair with the biological mother), review denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. 
LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007), with In re Jesusa 
V., 85 P.3d at 6-7 (stepfather asserting paternity where a child was conceived through 
his wife's extramarital affair with the biological father). An additional difference is that 
Heriberto was incarcerated during these proceedings and was unable to care for Jesusa. 
This fact, however, has no relation to standing. Id. at 7. Furthermore, Paul and Jesusa's 
mother, his wife, had lived apart for three years preceding Jesusa's birth, whereas Amy 
G. and Nathan's father had not spent any time apart. Id. 
247. It is a violation of a person's equal protection rights if treatment differs 
solely on the basis of gender and if the classification does not serve" 'important govern­
mental objectives'" and the means are not" 'substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.''' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982». 
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Furthermore, consideration of three parents for the purposes 
of standing would not be antithetical to the two-parent paradigm.248 
In this situation, the court could determine Nathan's two legal par­
ents at trial using the best interests of the child standard.249 Thus, 
while the two-parent paradigm would not apply to standing, it 
would be the mold used at trial. Therefore, the state's interest in a 
child having two legal parents would be protected.250 
However, the court in Amy G. found that In re Jesusa V. was 
not analogous because there were not two conflicting presump­
tions.251 The court stated that M.W., the biological mother, had 
standing under the maternity statute252 and, as such, was not a pre­
sumed parent so it could not weigh the two claims.253 This argu­
ment is again predicated on the differential treatment of 
stepparents based on gender. In In re Jesusa v., Heriberto and Paul 
were both presumed fathers and as such both independently had 
standing independently.254 It is conceded that M.W. has standing 
under California Family Code section 7650(b) because she gave 
birth to Nathan.255 However, Amy G. should also have standing as 
a presumed parent under a gender-neutral application of California 
Family Code sections 7611(a) and (d).256 Other than the gender of 
the parties, there is no difference between Heriberto and M.W.-as 
biological parents-or between Paul and Amy G.-as stepparents. 
If gender is ignored, the differences become semantic, and, by ap­
plying paternity provisions to maternity claims, any differences be­
come nonexistent.257 Therefore, both M.W. and Amy G. should 
have independent standing to assert a claim. Once they have stand­
ing, the court may choose either to treat their claims like conflicting 
presumptions of paternity,258 or to devise a different method of 
weighing M.W.'s interest as the biological mother and Amy G.'s 
248. See supra Part I.B.3. 
249. See supra Part I.B.4. 
250. See Jacobs, supra note 78, at 834; Meyer, supra note 20, at 133. 
251. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306 (stating that M.W.'s maternity is established 
by giving birth to Nathan; thus, the court stated she is not a presumed parent). 
252. [d. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2004)). 
253. [d.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(b). 
254. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa 
V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004). Heriberto had a rebuttable presumption under California 
Family Code section 7611(d) and Paul had a rebuttable presumption under sections 
7611(a) and (d). [d. 
255. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306. 
256. But see id. at 304. 
257. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 21 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 494 (2001). 
258. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b). 
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presumption as a stepmother.259 Either way, Amy G. should be af­
forded the chance to assert her claim. Denying her this opportunity 
treats her differently solely on the basis of gender, and it decides 
the issue of standing on the merits of the action without giving Amy 
G. an opportunity to be heard. 
2. 	 A Stepmother Is a Presumed Parent, Is an Interested 
Person in a Maternity Suit, and Should Have 
Standing 
It would be consistent with the UPA to determine that Amy G. 
is a presumed parent under a gender-neutral reading of California 
Family Code section 7611.260 The Amy G. court held that because 
Amy G. could not be Nathan's natural mother or presumed mother, 
she could not be made a party.261 The court began with the pre­
sumption that the "father and Amy's arguments all are predicated 
on Amy's claim [that] she is Nathan's mother."262 As noted above, 
this unwisely conflates the issues of standing and success on the 
merits. If the court had separated these issues, Amy G. could have 
argued that she should have been afforded standing because she 
was entitled to a presumption of maternity through a gender-neu­
tral reading of the UPA. Amy G.'s argument that she was Nathan's 
mother went to the merits of the action and should not have been 
part of the consideration of standing.263 
In the case of N.A.H., for example, the Colorado Supreme 
Court granted both a biological father and a husband standing in a 
paternity action, where a child was conceived through a wife's ex­
tramarital affair.264 The husband did not claim that he was the bio­
logical father.265 Rather, he asserted that he benefited from two 
presumptions of paternity under the UPA, and that the court 
should decide what was in the best interest of the child in determin­
259. See discussion infra Part III.E. 
260. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611. 
261. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307-08. 
262. [d. at 303. 
263. It is a much higher standard for Amy G. to prove that she is Nathan's natural 
mother rather than a presumed mother. Compare, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (pro­
viding that a parent-child relationship is established "[b]etween a child and the natural 
mother ... by proof of her having given birth to the child"), with CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7611 (stating that a presumption of paternity is established by a man being married to 
the natural mother or taking the child into his home and holding the child out as his 
own). 
264. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
265. [d. at 360, 362. 
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ing which presumption held greater weight.266 Similarly, Amy G.'s 
claim is not that she is Nathan's biological mother. Rather, her 
claim is that she has standing because she benefits from two pre­
sumptions of maternity, and that the court should determine who 
Nathan's legal mother is at trial.267 Since Amy G.'s claim is not 
predicated on her being Nathan's biological mother, she should 
have been treated like Paul in In re Jesusa V. and been granted 
standing. 
B. 	 Biology Should Not Trump in Determinations of Standing for 
Parentage 
This subpart details several reasons why a biological relation­
ship with the child should not be the sole factor in determining 
standing in a maternity action. Part III.B.l puts biology in proper 
context as one of many factors that determines parentage. Part 
III.B.2 analyzes why allowing a stepmother to have standing vio­
lates neither policy nor logic because stepmothers are a class of pre­
sumed parents who are accorded standing in parentage actions. 
1. 	 Biology Is One of Many Factors that Determines 
Parentage 
The court should not have held that M.W.'s biological relation­
ship with the child trumped all other considerations in determining 
maternity. Biology should be only one of many factors that the 
court considers in determining parentage.268 The California Su­
preme Court held that "biological paternity by a competing pre­
sumed father does not necessarily defeat a nonbiological father's 
presumption of paternity."269 Other cases have held that a person 
with no biological parental relationship with the child can be a pre­
sumed parent.270 Therefore, since a biological relationship with the 
266. /d. The husband claimed he benefited from the presumptions created by 
being married to the mother at the time of the child's conception and taking the child 
into his home. /d. 
267. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302-03. Amy G. should benefit from the pre­
sumptions created by being married to Nathan's father at the time of Nathan's concep­
tion and taking Nathan in and holding him out as her own. CAL. FAM. CODE § 761l. 
268. The court weighed factors beyond "planting the biological seed" such as 
looking at which person provided "stability, nurturance, family ties, [and] permanence" 
in determining that a stepfather was the legal father. L.A. County Dep't of Children & 
Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004). 
269. 	 Id. at 12. 
270. See, e.g., Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas 
H.), 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002) (holding that a father's admission that he was not the 
biological father did not rebut his presumed parent status because to do so would 
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child does not trump all other factors in all cases, biological mater­
nity should not automatically defeat a nonbiological mother's pre­
sumption of maternity.271 
Furthermore, legislatures, in adopting the UPA, have striven to 
include the greatest number of presumed fathers so that a child 
would not be rendered parentless.272 A biology-only approach to 
standing would clearly frustrate this legislative intent. If biology 
trumped all other presumptions, Jesusa, for example, would virtu­
ally not have a father because Heriberto was incarcerated when 
Jesusa's parentage was determined.273 One can imagine that a situ­
ation similar to Jesusa's may arise in which the biological mother is 
incarcerated and the failure to grant a stepmother standing would 
render the child, at least temporarily, motherless. Therefore, be­
cause these cases show that men who are not biologically related to 
the child can have standing, it is apparent that biology is not a con­
clusive factor in making parentage determinations. 
2. 	 Allowing a Stepmother to Have Standing in a Maternity 
Action Does Not Violate "Policy and Logic" 
As previously mentioned, many cases have declared that a par­
ent-child relationship exists between the child and a person who has 
no biological relationship to the child.274 There is no reason that 
Amy G.'s situation should be treated any differently. However, 
courts are still reluctant to declare maternity without a biological 
relationship to the child. Professor Dalton noted, pre-Elisa B., that 
a hierarchical system for categorizing non-biological parents has 
developed. Non-married (usually lesbian) non-biological 
render the child fatherless); Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re 
Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing the trial court's deci­
sion to deny presumed parent status to the half-sister of the child who took the child in 
when the mother died and where the child's biological father was unknown, because the 
half-sister held the child out as her own son and the child believed that he was her son); 
L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (remanding an order that denied a child's petition for 
a mother-child relationship where the child was taken in and cared for by a nonrelative 
woman). 
271. If biology were to automatically trump all other presumptions, it should be 
the same presumption for fathers and mothers. Furthermore, if the principle was that 
biology always trumps, each and every child should have a blood test at birth. Apple­
ton, supra note 58, at 270. 
272. See supra Part LA. 
273. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 6-7. 
274. See, e.g., In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705; In re Karen c., 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 677. 
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mothers exist at the bottom of the hierarchy. . . . Married non­
biological mothers exist in the middle of that hierarchy .... Mar­
ried non-biological fathers exist at the top of that hierarchy. . .. 
[T]he courts' assignment of parental status (and all of the rights 
and responsibilities that adhere to that status) is based primarily 
on an adult's position in this parenting hierarchy, a position that 
is based on his/her sex and marital status.275 
After Elisa B. was decided, however, nonmarried, nonbiological 
mothers have been afforded maternity rights in the context of 
same-sex relationships.276 Therefore, it seems that married, nonbi­
ological mothers have fallen to the bottom of this hierarchy. This 
hierarchy was reinforced by Amy G., in which the court declined to 
hold that Amy G. had standing.277 The Amy G. court stated that 
giving standing to Amy G. would have been antithetical to policy 
and logic.278 However, a finding of legal parentage in Amy G. and 
G.G. would have been consistent with the marital presumption and 
would have maintained the nuclear family-both favorable factors 
in the parentage determination.279 A decision to grant standing in a 
maternity claim that is in line with policy and logic does not require 
a biological relationship.280 Therefore, Amy G. should have been 
granted standing. 
c. Nathan Can Have Two Mothers Because Elisa B. Applies 
The Amy G. court should have applied the principles of Elisa 
B. 281 and held that Amy G. had standing because she could be N a­
275. Dalton, supra note 56, at 311-12 (citation omitted). 
276. See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (reversing the trial court's determination that a same-sex parent lacked standing 
because under Elisa B., a "former lesbian partner may be able to establish parentage 
under the Uniform Parentage Act as a presumed parent under a gender-neutral appli­
cation of section 7611, subsection (d)" and remanding for a factual finding of whether 
Charisma received the child into her home, held the child out as her own, actively par­
ticipated in causing the child to be conceived, accepted the obligations of parenthood, 
and whether there were any competing claims for status as the child's second parent). 
277. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review 
denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2007). 
278. Id. at 305. 
279. See supra Part I.B.l & .2. "[I]t is actually the nuclear family model, and not 
the biological parent-child relationships that theoretically support and define the stan­
dard, to which courts are actually committed" instead of a biological presumption. Dal­
ton, supra note 56, at 322. 
280. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of EI Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 666 
(Cal. 2005). 
281. Id. at 666-69. 
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than's mother. In Elisa B., the court held that a child can have two 
female parents.282 The principle was applied to the situation where 
one mother had no biological relationship to the child, but had re­
ceived the child into her home and held the child out as her own.283 
As a result of Elisa B., "[a] person's status as a presumed parent 
may be established regardless of gender or biological connec­
tion."284 Furthermore, "[a]fter Elisa B. it is much clearer that the 
statutory presumption of parentage actually does apply equally re­
gardless of biology, gender, sexual orientation, or marital status."285 
Therefore, it should not matter that Amy G. is Nathan's stepmother 
and not his stepfather. Under the reasoning of Elisa B., Amy G. is 
a presumed parent because her gender is irrelevant to the presump­
tions of parentage.286 
The court in Amy G. chose not to follow Elisa B. because in 
Elisa B. the court's holding that Elisa was a presumed parent, and 
ultimately a legal parent, was contingent on the statement that 
there were "no competing claims to her being the children's second 
parent."287 Since M.W. had a competing claim to Amy G.'s mater­
nity, the court distinguished its decision from that in Elisa B.288 
However, there are cases in which there have been competing 
claims for paternity, and each of the presumed fathers was granted 
standing and the court determined which one was the legal fa­
ther.289 Therefore, the application of Elisa B. should not be contin­
gent upon whether there are competing claims because this creates 
an inequitable result based on gender. If Amy G. had been a man 
asserting paternity, she would have had standing despite competing 
claims.290 
282. /d. at 666. 
283. [d. at 669; see Stone, supra note 68, at 531. 
284. Wald, supra note 20, at 149. 
285. [d. 
286. See generally Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666 ("We perceive no reason why both 
parents of a child cannot be women."). 
287. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting 
Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670), review denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. 
Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007). 
288. [d. 
289. See L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re 
Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). In 
N.A.H. the court remanded the case for the trial court to weigh the competing claims of 
paternity using the best interest of the child standard. [d.; see supra Part I.BA. 
290. See generally Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666; In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2; N.A.H., 9 
P.3d 354. 
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D. 	 The Marital Presumption Should Still Exist when the 
Husband Is Biologically Related to the Child and the 
Wife Is Asserting Maternity 
The marital presumption or the presumption of legitimacy has 
been a foundational principle for courts when determining parent­
age.291 This presumption should apply not only to husbands, but 
also to wives. Part III.D.l discusses how the marital presumption is 
ingrained in case law in a gender-biased way. Part III.D.2 argues 
that the marital presumption should apply equally to women and 
should not be rebutted when a wife admits that she has no biologi­
cal relationship with the child. 
1. 	 The Historical Benefit of the Presumption of Marriage Is 
Inequitably Linked to the Gender of the Spouse 
The presumption of legitimacy "traditionally operates in a 
gendered way."292 It "makes a married man the legal father of his 
wife's biological children, but does not make a married woman the 
legal mother of her husband's biological children."293 The pre­
sumption of legitimacy for women has been hindered because legal 
determinations of maternity are constantly linked to biology.294 
This creates an inequitable result. Professor Frelich Appleton 
noted that a husband may be presumed to be the father of his wife's 
child because of the marital presumption, but a wife is not pre­
sumed to be the mother of her husband's child.295 
If there is to be a presumption of legitimacy, it should extend 
to both the wife and the husband.296 The marital presumption pro­
tects a child's welfare by promoting a two-parent structure and 
291. See supra Part I.B.1. 
292. Appleton, supra note 58, at 237; see Dalton, supra note 56, at 289. 
293. Appleton, supra note 58, at 237; see also New, supra note 26, at 776 ("[T]he 
legal definition of motherhood has historically been biological in nature. . .. Paternity 
... has largely been socially defined ...."). 
294. 	 Appleton, supra note 58, at 238. 
295. /d. at 237; see Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 306-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (refusing to apply the marital presumption to a woman), review denied, No. 
S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 
(2007). 
296. See Appleton, supra note 58, at 238. "When it comes to parentage, ... even­
handed treatment of male and females eludes the courts because they 'remain incapable 
of imagining a gender-free subject.'" Id. (quoting Dalton, supra note 56, at 266). 
Moreover, Professor Appleton argued that the marital presumption should also apply 
to same-sex couples because it supports child welfare and helps eliminate discrimina­
tion based on sexual orientation. Id. at 230-31, 246. 
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maintaining stability in a child's life.297 Courts' differential treat­
ment of parentage determinations based on gender is inequitable 
because when women who are not biologically related to the child 
seek legal maternity, "judges frequently respond by narrowly con­
structing parenthood in ways that preserve traditional conceptions 
of motherhood and family."298 Thus, when women want to estab­
lish parentage based on the marital presumption, courts tend to shy 
away. However, when men want to establish parentage based on 
the marital presumption, they are granted standing merely because 
of an unwarranted and inequitable adherence to traditional notions 
of family and reproduction.299 Amy G. should not have been de­
nied standing in the parentage action solely on the basis of gen­
der-the marital presumption should apply to both the husband 
and the wife. 
2. 	 Because the Marital Presumption Is Not Rebutted by a 
Husband Admitting He Is Not the Biological Father, It 
Should Not Be Rebutted by a Wife Admitting She 
Is Not the Biological Mother 
Amy G.'s marital presumption should not be rebutted by her 
admission that she is not the biological mother. In N.A.H., a step­
father's claim to paternity was not rebutted300 and his standing was 
retained even after it was stipulated that he was not the child's bio­
logical father. 30l With the exception of her gender, Amy G. is in 
the same position as the husband in N.A.H. 302 
297. See id. at 243-46; see also Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I. 
1990) (holding that a trial judge in a divorce proceeding erred in allowing evidence that 
disproved the husband's paternity because the "court's adherence to the statutory pre­
sumption of paternity ... and [its] application of the equitable-estoppel doctrine lead to 
the same point: the genetic blood test results offered into evidence were not relevant 
because legal paternity had been established and biological paternity was not at issue." 
(citing R.1. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-3(a)(3)(ii) (2003))); Zinsmeister, supra note 80, at 1006­
07; supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the two-parent paradigm). 
298. Dalton, supra note 56, at 293. 
299. See generally L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. 
(In re Jesusa Y.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004); Appleton, supra note 58, at 238. 
300. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). The court ultimately did 
not decide the issue of legal paternity, but remanded to determine the best interest of 
the child. Id. at 366. However, in N.A.H., the parties agreed that genetic testing would 
show the putative father to be the biological father within ninety-seven percent accu­
racy. Id. at 358. 
301. Id. at 358-59 (procedural posture); see also In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2. 
302. Compare Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review 
denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2007), with N.A.H., 9 P.3d 354. 
814 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:773 
Section 106 of the UPA provides that sections of that Act gov­
erning paternity apply equally to maternity actions.303 The holding 
in Amy G., that the marital presumption did not apply because of 
her gender, was a drastic deviation from the court's prior gender­
neutral application of the UPA.304 Along these lines, Professor Ap­
pleton noted that "[ d]epartures from gender neutrality raise signifi­
cant policy concerns that compel proceeding with caution. What 
message does the law signal in treating female and male parents 
differently?"30S As the husband in N.A.H. retained his standing in 
his paternity action after admitting that he was not the biological 
father, so too should Amy G. have retained her standing in her ma­
ternity action. Notwithstanding her gender, she should benefit 
from the marital presumption and her admission of the lack of a 
biological relationship to the child should not rebut that 
presumption. 
E. 	 Courts Can Weigh Competing Presumptions for Maternity 
Through a Gender-Neutral Reading of the Paternity Statutes 
The court can weigh presumptions of maternity in the same 
way that it weighs presumptions of paternity. In denying Amy G. 
standing, the court stated that even if it found that Amy G. had 
standing as a presumed mother, it could not weigh Amy G.'s and 
M.W.'s claims because "[n]o mechanism exists in other provisions 
of the UPA to resolve such a conflict."306 In effect, the court was 
stating that because the drafters of the UPA did not include a mech­
anism for weighing maternity claims, such a mechanism was not in­
tended and the UPA should not be interpreted to include it.307 
However, this assertion is inconsistent with the way that courts 
have previously interpreted the UPA.308 
For example, in Johnson v. Calvert, the court decided that the 
UPA governed surrogacy disputes and applied it to hold that a hus­
303. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 106 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2008); 
see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122 
(West 2005). 
304. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 
2005); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 106 (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 14. 
305. 	 Appleton, supra note 58, at 268. 
306. 	 Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306. 
307. 	 [d. 
308. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779-80 (Cal. 1993) (applying 
the UPA to situations that were not contemplated when the UPA was drafted). 
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band and wife, whose genetic material was implanted into the ges­
tational mother, were the legal parents of a child born to the 
gestational mother.309 The court eoted that the passage of the UPA 
"clearly was not motivated by the need to resolve surrogacy dis­
putes, which were virtually unknown in 1975."310 Accordingly, the 
1975 version of the California's Act did not have an applicable pro­
vision for weighing the claims of a gestational mother against those 
of a genetic mother.31l However, noting that the UPA "facially ap­
plies to any parentage determination," the court applied it to the 
surrogacy dispute.312 Thus, the court in Johnson found the UPA 
applicable to competing maternity claims, notwithstanding its lack 
of an expressly provided mechanism because, "[n]ot uncommonly, 
courts must construe statutes in factual settings not contemplated 
by the enacting legislature."313 
Johnson shows that courts should be flexible in applying the 
UPA because advances in science and the evolving definition of 
family frequently result in situations not considered by the drafters. 
The court in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca stated that the reason that the 
legislature and the courts have not made an explicit statement ap­
plying paternity presumptions to maternity "is that the issue almost 
never arises except for extraordinary cases involving artificial re­
production."314 Buzzanca was decided in 1998.315 Since then, there 
have been increasing scientific advances, and the definition of fam­
ily has evolved. These changes have increasingly resulted in the 
need to apply the UPA to unforeseen scenarios. As the court stated 
in Buzzanca, even though cases involving maternity are not as com­
mon as paternity actions, courts can still apply various provisions of 
the UPA in the same manner that they apply to all parentage ac­
tions.316 Similarly, a court is not precluded from interpreting the 
UPA in a gender-neutral fashion to weigh maternity claims.317 
Therefore, the court should have accorded Amy G. standing and 
subsequently weighed her claim against M.W.'s claim. 
309. Id. at 779, 782. 
310. Id. at 779. The court was referring to California's version of the UPA, which 
was introduced and enacted in 1975. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. Id.; see also Milena D. O'Hara & Andrew W. Vorzimer, In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca: Charting a New Destiny, 26 W. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 29 (1999). 
314. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
315. Id. at 280. 
316. Id. at 289-290. 
317. Id.; see lohnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
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CONCLUSION 
The enactment and adoption of the UPA has been critical to 
parentage determinations. However, the evolution of the definition 
of family and scientific advances increasingly "make it difficult to 
speak of an average American family";318 and make the Donna 
Reed mold simply insufficient. Therefore, courts must interpret the 
UPA to apply to situations that were unforeseen when the UPA was 
drafted. There are a number of reasons why Amy G. should have 
standing as an interested person in the maternity action through a 
gender-neutral interpretation of the UPA. First, the presence of 
competing claims to maternity is not dispositive because Nathan 
can have more than two parents for the purposes of standing, and 
the court must weigh the competing claims for a determination of 
his two legal parents.319 Second, it should not matter that Amy G. 
was not biologically related to Nathan because biology does not 
trump all in parentage determinations.320 Third, Elisa B. applies 
because standing in a maternity suit should not be contingent upon 
the absence of competing claims to parentage, as this creates a dis­
criminatory result based on gender.321 Fourth, Amy G. should have 
benefited from the marital presumption, which should not just be 
afforded to the husband, but also to the wife.322 Finally, the court 
should have granted Amy G. standing and weighed her presump­
tion against M.W.'s claim at trial because the UPA can be used to 
resolve new issues not anticipated when the Act was drafted.323 
The court should have allowed Amy G. to have standing to assert 
her claim so that other stepmothers, who have an established rela­
tionship with their stepchildren, can raise a claim to maternity and 
have standing to be heard. The time has come to say goodbye to 
Donna Read and to embrace a gender-neutral reading of the stand­
ing provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act. 
Megan S. Calvo * 
318. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
319. See supra Part III.A. 
320. See supra Part III.B. 
321. See supra Part III.e. 
322. See supra Part III.D. 
323. See supra Part III.E. 
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